

Unambiguous Encapsulation


**Separating Data and Signaling
LangSec workshop 2015**

Michael Ossmann


Primary on Unambiguous Encapsulation

Creator of multiple OSHW projects, Ubertooth, HackRF, Daisho, YARD Stick One

Founder of Great Scott Gadgets



Dominic Spill



Code for Unambiguous Encapsulation

Dev on Uberetooth, BTBB, gr-bluetooth, Daisho, USBProxy

Other projects include BeagleDancer, PS/2 tap and fcc.io

Disclaimer

The views expressed are the views of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.

Outline

The Problem

Unambiguous Encapsulation

Error Control Codes

Finding Interesting Error Control Codes

Background

LANGSEC

Packets in Packets

The Problem - Packets in Packets

Interference or glitch obscures packet header

Second packet in payload

Receiver detects second packet

Zigbee / Ethernet susceptible

The Problem - Packets in Packets

```
cumberland% goodfet.ccsapi sniff | head
Listening as 00deadbeef on 2405 MHz
# DEBUG Clearing overflow
# 2f 01 08 82 de ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 00 00 00 00 a7 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 ff ff ff
# 2f 01 08 82 de ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 00 00 00 00 a7 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 ff ff ff
# 2f 01 08 82 de ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 00 00 00 00 a7 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 ff ff ff
# 2f 01 08 82 de ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 00 00 00 00 a7 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 ff ff ff
# 2f 01 08 82 de ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 00 00 00 00 a7 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 ff ff ff
# 2f 01 08 82 de ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 00 00 00 00 a7 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 ff ff ff
# 2f 01 08 82 de ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 00 00 00 00 a7 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 ff ff ff
```

```
cumberland% goodfet.ccsapi bsniiff | head
Listening as 00deadbeef on 2405 MHz
# 19 01 08 b2 ff ff ff ff 28 7d 0a 02 00 00 00 00 00 17 00 0b 00 00 00 ed 48 ff
# 19 01 08 b3 ff ff ff ff 28 7d 0a 02 00 00 00 00 00 1f 00 0b 00 00 00 d9 5e ff
# 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 ff 1e
# 19 01 08 bb ff ff ff ff 28 7d 0a 02 00 00 00 00 00 17 00 0b 00 00 00 f0 cc 6b
# 0f 01 08 82 ff ff ff ff de ad be ef ba be c0 ff 00
# 0f 01 08 bf ff ff ff ff 4d 7d 09 00 1f 00 61 13 52
# 19 01 08 cd ff ff ff ff 28 7d 0a 92 99 08 76 00 00 00 17 00 0b 00 00 00 50 7f 6b
# 19 01 08 d5 ff ff ff ff 28 7d 0a 02 00 00 00 00 00 0f 00 0b 00 00 00 3a c6 0f
# 19 01 08 d6 ff ff ff ff 28 7d 0a 02 00 00 00 00 00 17 00 0b 00 00 00 66 fb ff
```

These are slower than normal packets & mixed into normal sniff, so result is from missed SPI, not stop/start.

Ethernet Too!

INVERSE  PATH

Packet-In-Packet on wired Ethernet

| Idle | SSD | Preamble | SFD | Data | SFD | Data | FCS | ESD | Idle |

```
17:47:15.972801 00:1f:16:37:b1:3d > 00:22:6b:dc:c6:55, ethertype IPv4  
(0x0800), length 1104: (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 20574, offset 0, flags [none],  
proto UDP (17), length 1090)
```

```
192.168.0.1.37501 > 192.168.66.10.53: 49159+ A? google.com. (1062)  
0x0000: 0022 6bdc c655 001f 1637 b13d 0800 4500 ."k..U...7.=..E.  
0x0010: 0442 505e 0000 4011 62f1 c0a8 0001 c0a8 .BP^...@.b.....  
0x0020: 420a 927d 0035 0024 0000 c007 0100 0001 B..}.5.$.....  
0x0030: 0000 0000 0000 0667 6f6f 676c 6503 636f .....google.co  
0x0040: 6d00 0001 0001 0000 749c 9b85 0000 0000 m.....t.....  
0x0050: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....  
.....  
0x01f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....  
0x0200: 2165 c8fe 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 !e.....  
0x0210: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....  
.....  
0x0400: 0055 5555 5555 5555 d500 1f16 37f2 ff00 ..UUUUUU...7...  
0x0410: 1f16 37b1 3d08 0045 0000 3900 0040 0040 ..7.=..E..9...@.@  
0x0420: 0616 bb0a 0108 020a 0108 0102 9a02 9a00 .....  
0x0430: 0000 0000 0000 0050 0200 004f 5500 0000 .....P...OU...  
0x0440: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0066 6f6f 6261 7200 .....foobar.
```

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Fully arbitrary 802.3 packet injection

Credit: Andrea Barisani and Daniele Bianco

The Problem - Buffer Overflow

User supplied data written to buffer

Overwrite data on stack

CPU executes data as instructions

Ambiguous Encapsulation

Given a piece of data without context, it is not possible to determine if it is meta-data or encapsulated data

Unambiguous Encapsulation

Given a piece of data without context, it is possible to determine if it is meta-data or encapsulated data

If you haven't found the
analog medium
beneath a particular bit
or byte, keep digging

Error Control Codes

Error control codes are used at the boundary between analog and digital

Can we find error control codes that provide useful encapsulation properties?

Error Control Codes

Encapsulate data in codewords

Binary Linear Block Codes encode k data bits in n bit codewords with a minimum Hamming distance d

Often designated by $[n,k]$ or $[n,k,d]$

[7,4,3] Hamming Code

0000000	0101010		1000011
		1101001	
1110000	1011010		0110011
		0011001	
1001100	1100110		0001111
		0100101	
0111100	0010110		1111111
		1010101	

Each codeword is 7 bits long, $n = 7$

There are 2^4 codewords, $k = 4$

At least 3 bits differ between any two codewords, $d = 3$

[7,4,3] Hamming Code

codeword length = 7

number of codewords = 2^4

minimum Hamming distance = 3

One bit flipped: error corrected

Two bits flipped: error detected

Three bits flipped: undetected error

Implementation

[7,4,3] Hamming encoder:

look-up table: $16 * 7$ bits

[7,4,3] Hamming decoder:

look-up table: $128 * 4$ bits

Much of the complexity of coding theory is related to clever decoding methods, but a look-up table works for shorter (small n) codes

Brute Force Coding

Decoding by look-up table is sort of a brute force approach

We can also take a brute force approach to the discovery of new codes

A [5,3,2] Code

00000		01110	
	00011		10110
00101		11010	
	01001		11100

Hamming Distance = 2

Isolation



A code can be thought of as a pair of complementary sub-codes.

A [5,3,2,3] Isolated Complementary Binary Block Code (ICBBC)

codeword length = 5

number of codewords = 2^3

minimum Hamming distance = 2

minimum isolation = 3

One bit flipped: error detected

Two bits flipped: undetectable error, isolated

Three bits flipped: isolation broken

Searching for codes

C program to brute force search for codes

Depth First Search recursive algorithm

Other search methods

FPGA

Verilog implementation shows promise

Recursion difficult unless we know max depth of recursion at compile time

Z3 Python

Implementation of icbbc search exist

Fast non-exhaustive search

ICBBC Search

Search space

$$2 \leq n \leq 8$$

$$1 \leq \text{Hamming distance} \leq n$$

$$\text{Hamming distance} \leq \text{isolation} \leq n$$

Some larger codes sought

[15,7,9] code produce 111GB of output

ICBBC Search Results

Results

19,189,776 codes found

Symmetric codes


$[8,3,5]$ / $[8,4,5]$ - similar subcode sizes

Asymmetric codes

$[8,2,5]$ - subcodes of 2 / 44 codewords

Isolated Complementary Non-Binary Block Codes (ICNBC)

a 7-PSK
example



Lee
Distance
from 2 to 6
is 3

Lee Distance from $(2, 1, 3)$ to $(6, 6, 6)$ is $3+2+3=8$

ICNBC Examples

2 symbol codewords, minimum Lee distance of 2, isolation of 5:

$[(0, 0), (1, 1)]$ $[(3, 4), (4, 3), (4, 5), (5, 4)]$

3 symbol codewords, minimum Lee distance of 5, isolation of 7:

$[(0, 0, 0), (4, 6, 6)]$ $[(3, 3, 2), (6, 4, 3)]$

ICNBC Search

Largest search space of the project

11,000 sets of parameters

$$2 \leq n \leq 9$$

$$1 \leq \text{Lee distance} \leq 2n$$

$$1 \leq \text{isolation} \leq 2n$$

ICNBC Search Results

Results

20GB of successful output

Some processes constrained by resources

Very few symmetric codes

Asymmetric codes

[5,1,8] - subcodes of 2 / 10,264 codewords

[5,2,15] - subcodes of 2 / 4 codewords

Large Complementary Binary Block Codes (LCBBC)

Sometimes the largest binary block code for a given codeword length and Hamming distance is not a power of two.

Example: 8 bit codewords, minimum Hamming distance of 3, 20 codewords:

[0, 7, 25, 30, 42, 53, 75, 84, 97, 108, 114, 127, 140, 147, 166, 169, 176, 194, 197, 216]

LCBBC Search

Search space

$$2 \leq n \leq 15$$

$$2 \leq \text{Hamming distance} \leq n$$

LCBBC Search Results

Smallest set of search results

~1MB

Smaller search space

Only searching for longest code

Code Selection

Error control codes are typically selected based on:

- code rate (k/n)

- complexity of decoder

- probability of undetectable error

- probability of uncorrectable error

We suggest an addition to this list:

- probability of encapsulation breakage

Future Work

Implementations

gr-802.15.4

Ethernet using Daisho

Harvard architecture / NX replacement

Additional code classes

Investigate the nature of noise

Unambiguous Encapsulation

Any time you encapsulate data within other data, consider unambiguous encapsulation

Thank You

LANGSEC community

DARPA Cyber Fast Track

Sergey Bratus

David Hulton

Mike Kershaw

Tariq Bashir Ahmad

Questions?

<http://github.com/mossmann/unambiguous-encapsulation>

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